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The Right to Counsel in Criminal
Cases: The Law and the Reality in
Rhode Island District Court
Andrew Horwitz*
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court ruled in the land-
mark case of Gideon v. Wainwright' that the constitutional right
of criminal defendants to be represented by counsel, appointed by
the court if the defendant is indigent, extended to state criminal
proceedings. In the forty years that have passed since that deci-
sion, the Supreme Court has rendered any number of opinions
that further expand upon and explore this critical constitutional
right. The harsh reality of daily proceedings in Rhode Island Dis-
trict Court today, however, reveals that significant numbers of
misdemeanor criminal cases are resolved by plea at the arraign-
ment stage without adherence to the constitutional mandate of
Gideon and its progeny. In this essay, I will briefly explore the pa-
rameters of the right to counsel, the critical importance of the
right to counsel when a misdemeanor case is resolved by the entry
of a plea, the findings required before a court may lawfully find
that the right to counsel has been waived, and the inadequacies of
current Rhode Island practice in this regard.
I. THE SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs, Roger
Williams University School of Law. B.A. 1983, Haverford College; J.D. 1986,
New York University School of Law. The author would like to thank Daniel
Williams for his excellent research assistance.
1. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 2 While
there is some room for disagreement under current federal consti-
tutional law about exactly when in the life of a criminal case the
right to counsel first attaches, there can be no dispute that the
right has plainly attached at the moment a defendant enters a
guilty or nolo contendere plea to a criminal charge, whether at an
arraignment or at some later stage of the proceedings.3 Similarly,
after the United States Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Ala-
bama v. Shelton,4 there can no longer be any serious dispute un-
der federal constitutional law about what class of criminal
defendants is entitled to appointed counsel. In that case, the Su-
preme Court clarified that an indigent defendant's right to ap-
pointed counsel is not limited to those cases in which he or she is
imprisoned at the time of sentencing, but extends to the class of
cases in which the defendant is left "vulnerab[le] to imprison-
ment."5 While Shelton involved a defendant who was given a sus-
pended jail sentence, the logic of the case would clearly dictate
that its holding extend equally to the imposition of a period of
probation or, in the Rhode Island context, even to the imposition
of a "filing"6 on a complaint. 7 Indeed, the Court's holding in Shel-
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. A similar provision can be found in the Rhode
Island Constitution. See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 10.
3. See Iowa v. Tovar, 124 S. Ct. 1379, 1382 (2004).
4. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
5. Id. at 674.
6. Under R.I. GEN. LAwS § 12-10-12(c) (2003), a criminal complaint may
be filed for a period of one year and, if no further action is taken on that com-
plaint, the complaint will be "automatically quashed and destroyed" and all
records concerning the complaint expunged. If a filing follows from a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere, as it does in the vast majority of filed cases, and the
court subsequently finds that the defendant has violated the terms and con-
ditions of the filing, the court is authorized to sentence the defendant to a pe-
riod of imprisonment. Id.
7. The premise of the Court's holding in Shelton was that it would never
be proper to impose actual incarceration in a case in which the right to coun-
sel had not been scrupulously honored, even if counsel were provided at the
violation hearing stage. The Court noted that in Alabama, just like in Rhode
Island, the substantive and procedural rules in place at a violation hearing
are far more limited than those in place at a trial. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 666.
For that reason, the Court held that a violation hearing "cannot compensate
for the absence of trial counsel, for it does not even address the key Sixth
Amendment inquiry: whether the adjudication of guilt corresponding to the
prison sentence is sufficiently reliable to permit incarceration." Id. at 667.
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ton would seem to squarely cover almost every case that is re-
solved by plea at the arraignment stage in Rhode Island.8
One need not dig very deep into United States Supreme Court
case law to find clear expressions from that Court about the criti-
cal importance of the right to counsel. Perhaps the most famous of
these expressions can be found in Powell v. Alabama,9 in which
the Court first established the right to appointed counsel in fed-
eral criminal cases:
The... right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little
avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the intelligent layman has small and some-
times no skill in the science of law. If charged with a
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for him-
self whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamil-
iar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of
counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper charge,
and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence ir-
relevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks
both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defence, even though he have a perfect one. He requires
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceed-
ings against him.' 0
While it might have some superficial appeal to focus on the
right to counsel as though it took on special significance only in
felony cases or at the trial stage of a case, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly and vigorously rejected each of these contentions.
In Argersinger v. Hamlin," for example, in extending the
right to appointed counsel to misdemeanor cases that lead to in-
carceration, the Court explicitly rejected the notion that there is
any necessary relationship between the need for counsel and the
possible sentence that might be imposed. 12 The Court noted its
8. The one category of cases that the holding in Shelton probably would
not cover would be cases that are resolved by the imposition of a fine without
an accompanying filing or period of probation. Such a sentence is rarely im-
posed in Rhode Island except in cases alleging that the defendant was operat-
ing a motor vehicle without a valid driver's license.
9. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
10. Id. at 68-69
11. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
12. Id. at 33-34.
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particular concern with "the guilty plea, a problem that looms
large in misdemeanor as well as in felony cases," holding that
"[ciounsel is needed so that the accused may know exactly what he
is doing, so that he is fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or
prison, and so that he may be treated fairly by the prosecution."13
The Court explained its holding by pointing out that it is in the
misdemeanor context, even more than in the felony context, that
the sheer volume of cases can "create an obsession for speedy dis-
positions, regardless of the fairness of the result."14 In order to
protect defendants from that sort of "assembly-line justice," the
Court held that counsel must be appointed even in misdemeanor
cases if a term of imprisonment is imposed. 5 A number of lower
courts have expressed the same view regarding the importance of
counsel in misdemeanor cases, noting that alleged misdemeanants
at the arraignment stage make particularly easy targets for injus-
tice. As the Ninth Circuit suggested recently, "an innocent defen-
dant, unaware of the potential consequences of a misdemeanor
conviction, may be more likely to waive counsel and plead guilty
simply to 'get the whole thing over with,' especially if the defen-
dant suspects he will be sentenced to time served." 6
Just as the notion that the right to counsel is somehow more
important in felony cases has been roundly rejected, so too has the
notion that it has enhanced importance only at the trial stage. As
early as 1948, in Von Moltke v. Gillies, 7 the United States Su-
preme Court recognized the central importance of representation
at the moment a defendant enters a plea. In that case, the plural-
ity opinion clarified that "the constitutional right to the assistance
of counsel is of no less moment to an accused who must decide
whether to plead guilty than to an accused who stands trial." 8
The opinion went on to point out that, in complex cases, "Deter-
mining whether an accused is guilty or innocent ... is seldom a
simple and easy task for a layman, even though acutely intelli-
gent." 9 Just over twenty years later, citing Von Moltke with ap-
13. Id. at 34.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 36-37.
16. United States v. Akins, 276 F.3d 1141, 1148 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002).
17. 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948).
18. Id. at 721.
19. Id.
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proval, the Court once again suggested that "an intelligent as-
sessment of the relative advantages of pleading guilty is fre-
quently impossible without the assistance of an attorney."20
Perhaps the Third Circuit has said it best:
[A] hearing on a plea of guilty is a critical stage in the
proceedings against the accused, one in which his need
for counsel is most urgent. The exercise of judgment on
the factual issues, the legal problems of evidence by
which facts may be proven, the elements and ingredients
of the crime charged, all these are matters which no lay-
man, however intelligent or how often embroiled in legal
proceedings, can be presumed to comprehend adequately,
especially when, because his own freedom is at stake, it
would be impossible to expect of him the detached, imper-
sonal judgment which is the unique contribution of a pro-
fessional advisor.21
In recognition of the fact that a layman who believes that he
is guilty may be "'willing to confess, and yet may have a viable de-
fense that he ought to invoke, or may be pleading guilty to the
wrong grade of crime,' 22 the Ninth Circuit has declared that
"[niowhere is counsel more important than at a plea proceeding."23
II. WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: ADEQUACY OF THE WARNINGS
Having accepted the propositions that one is constitutionally
entitled to counsel, appointed by the court if necessary, for virtu-
ally every misdemeanor case, and that one is constitutionally enti-
tled to have that counsel present at the stage at which a plea is
entered, the next question is whether the defendant has somehow
waived that right before entering a plea without counsel. As a
matter of constitutional jurisprudence, deciding a question of
waiver involves two distinct inquiries: was the defendant ade-
quately informed of the right to counsel, and did the defendant ef-
20. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 n.6 (1970).
21. United States v. MacDonald, 343 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 1965).
22. United States v. Akins, 276 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting
William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761,
830 (1989)).
23. Id. at 1147.
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fectuate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary24 waiver of that
right?
In the leading right to counsel case of Patterson v. Illinois,25
the United States Supreme Court ruled on "the type of warnings
and procedures that should be required before a waiver of that
right will be recognized."26 There, the Court clearly held that an
accused's waiver of the right to counsel cannot be "knowing"
unless he or she has been advised of "the usefulness of counsel to
the accused at the particular proceeding, and the dangers to the
accused of proceeding without counsel."27 In its most recent pro-
nouncement on the right, Iowa v. Tovar,28 the Court rejected the
notion that the constitution requires any specific "formula or
script to be read to a defendant who states that he wants to pro-
ceed without counsel."29 Instead, the Court noted, a determination
of the adequacy of the "information a defendant must possess in
order to make an intelligent election, our decisions indicate, will
depend upon a range of case-specific factors."30
Few lower courts have discussed the significance of the Pat-
terson Court's holding in the context of a purported waiver of the
right to counsel at a plea. One notable example is United States v.
Akins, 31 in which the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant had not
made a knowing waiver of the right to counsel at a plea even
though he signed a document that stated that his plea of guilty
24. A strong argument can be made that a good number of pro se misde-
meanor pleas are entered each day in district court in which the purported
waiver of the right to counsel is involuntary. As a matter of routine, defen-
dants without attorneys are offered a "take-it-or-leave-it" disposition in which
the choice is between pleading guilty or nolo contendere and being released
from custody or asking for an attorney and being incarcerated. One case, in
which a judge told a defendant that a plea offer he had conveyed would be re-
voked if the defendant sought time to speak with an attorney, has become the
basis for an ethics charge against a district court judge. Tracy Breton, Pir-
raglia Challenges Ethics Complaints, PROVIDENCE J., May 21, 2003, at B1. In
his defense, Judge Robert J. Pirraglia said that such "take-it-or-leave-it" of-
fers are a "longstanding practice" of the district court. Id. The issue of volun-
tariness, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
25. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
26. Id. at 298.
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. 124 S. Ct. 1379, 1382 (2004).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 276 F. 3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2002).
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was "a knowing and intelligent waiver" of his right "to an attor-
ney, even at public expense."32 Quoting Faretta v. California,33 the
court noted that a waiver of the right to counsel "is knowing and
intelligent only if it comes after the defendant has been 'made
aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so
that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and
his choice is made with eyes open."'34 The court went on to stress
that most defendants, even those who are intelligent and those
with lengthy criminal histories, are not well equipped to evaluate
the validity of a criminal charge or the availability of legal or con-
stitutional defenses to that charge.35 Because a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere "relieves the state of its burden of proof in a
criminal case," the court found that "ensuring the validity of the
plea is of vital importance."36 As the written waiver in that case
did not adequately "indicate the dangers and disadvantages of
proceeding without counsel," the court refused to find a knowing
and intelligent waiver.3 7
Case law in Rhode Island suggests that the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island has adopted, as it must, a similar standard for test-
ing the adequacy of the warnings given to a defendant who seeks
to waive the right to counsel. In State v. Spencer,38 the court
quoted from Faretta in holding that a defendant "must be 'made
aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so
that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and
his choice is made with eyes open."' 39
III. WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: ADEQUACY OF THE WAIVER
In a situation in which the defendant has been adequately
warned about the "dangers and disadvantages" of proceeding at
32. Id.
33. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
34. Akins, 276 F.3d at 1146 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835). The Su-
preme Court of Rhode Island has quoted the same language from Faretta
with approval. See, e.g., State v. Spencer, 783 A.2d 413, 416 (R.I. 2001) (quot-
ing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835).
35. Akins, 276 F.3d at 1147-48.
36. Id. at 1147.
37. Id. at 1149.
38. 783 A.2d 413 (R.I. 2001).
39. Id. at 416 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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the plea stage without the assistance of counsel, the next inquiry
becomes whether or not the defendant has understood those warn-
ings sufficiently to execute a knowing and intelligent waiver. In
determining whether the constitutional right to counsel has been
waived in such a fashion, the United States Supreme Court has
clearly held that it will "'indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver."'40 The American Bar Association, in its Standards
for Criminal Justice related to Pleas of Guilty, suggests, "Before
accepting a guilty plea from an uncounselled defendant, the court
should require the defendant to meet with appointed counsel for
consultation purposes."41
In the absence of counsel appointed for that purpose, the Su-
preme Court has held, "The determination of whether there has
been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in
each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surround-
ing that case, including the background, experience, and conduct
of the accused."42 In Von Moltke v. Gillies,43 a plurality of the Su-
preme Court wrote at some length about the obligations of a trial
judge in the face of a purported waiver of counsel at the plea
stage:
We have said: 'The constitutional right of an accused to
be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection
of a trial court, in which the accused - whose life or lib-
erty is at stake - is without counsel. This protecting duty
imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the
trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent
and competent waiver by the accused.' To discharge this
duty properly in light of the strong presumption against
40. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)).
41. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY, Commen-
tary to Standard 14-1.3(b) (3d ed. 1999); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, Standard 5-8.2(b) (3d ed.
1992) ("If an accused in a proceeding involving the possibility of incarceration
has not seen a lawyer and indicates an intention to waive the assistance of
counsel, a lawyer should be provided before any in-court waiver is accepted.");
UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 711(b) (1987) ("The court, in the case of a misdemeanor may
and, in the case of a felony, shall refuse to accept a waiver of counsel unless a
lawyer consults with the defendant before the defendant waives counsel.").
42. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.
43. 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
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waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, a judge must
investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circum-
stances of the case before him demand. The fact that an
accused may tell him that he is informed of his right to
counsel and desires to waive this right does not automati-
cally end the judge's responsibility.... A judge can make
certain that an accused's professed waiver of counsel is
understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrat-
ing and comprehensive examination of all the circum-
stances under which such a plea is tendered.... [A] mere
routine inquiry - the asking of several standard questions
followed by the signing of a standard written waiver of
counsel - may leave a judge entirely unaware of the facts
essential to an informed decision that an accused has
executed a valid waiver of his right to counsel. 44
Some lower courts have interpreted Von Moltke as imposing a
mandatory colloquy with the defendant on the record in order to
explore the knowing and intelligent nature of the purported
waiver,45 while the vast majority of others have said that an indi-
vidualized colloquy, while not constitutionally mandated, is
clearly preferred.46
In the absence of an individual colloquy, many courts have
found that a waiver will rarely be upheld on appeal because the
defendant's comprehension of the waiver cannot be established. In
Bellevue v. Acrey,47 for example, the Supreme Court of Washington
expressed its clear preference for a colloquy on the record but sug-
gested that, in the absence of a colloquy, it would "look at any evi-
dence on the record that shows the defendant's actual awareness
of the risks of self-representation."48 The court was quick to point
44. Id. at 723-24 (citations omitted).
45. See Bellevue v. Acrey, 691 P.2d 957, 961 (Wash. 1984) (listing several
federal circuit courts that require an individual colloquy).
46. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.3(b) (3d ed.
2000). This group of courts includes the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.. See,
e.g., State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016, 1026 (R.I. 2002) (noting that an
individual colloquy, "while preferable, is not constitutionally required"); State
v. Spencer, 783 A.2d 413, 416 (R.I. 2001) (noting that "the simplest method to
determine whether a waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary may be a
detailed colloquy between the trial court and the defendant").
47. 691 P.2d 957 (Wash. 1984).
48. Id. at 962.
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out, however, that "in no case will mere evidence of the defen-
dant's literacy, educational level, common sense, or prior experi-
ence with the criminal justice system be sufficient to show an
awareness of these risks."49 While a defendant's background may
be "relevant" to the waiver determination, it is clearly not suffi-
cient because the "fact that a defendant is well educated, can read,
or has been on trial previously is not dispositive as to whether he
understood the relative advantages and disadvantages of self-
representation in a particular situation."50 In reversing the defen-
dant's conviction, the court noted that "only rarely will adequate
information exist on the record, in the absence of a colloquy, to
show the required awareness of the risks of self-representation."51
In State v. DeRoche,52 the Supreme Court of Louisiana refused
to find that a defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of
the right to counsel at a guilty plea even in the face of a "printed
waiver form advising him of his right to counsel and warning him
of the danger of self-representation."53 In that case, the record es-
tablished that the trial judge "canvassed [the defendant] with re-
gard to some of the trial rights he was waiving, but fail[ed] to
show that the court also inquired into [the defendant's] capacity to
waive his right to assistance of counsel in making the decision
whether to go to trial."54 Accordingly, the court held that the re-
cord did not "affirmatively establish a valid waiver of counsel."55
The Supreme Court of Utah, citing Acrey with approval, has
likewise found that information about a defendant's background,
while relevant, cannot answer the central question concerning the
defendant's actual comprehension of the dangers and disadvan-
tages of self-representation. 56 In that case, State v. Frampton,57
the court noted that "[g]enerally, this information can only be elic-
ited after penetrating questioning by the trial court."58 In describ-
ing the kind of questioning that it envisioned as constitutionally
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 682 So. 2d 1251 (La. 1996).
53. Id. at 1252.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 188 (Utah 1987).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 187.
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adequate, the court referred to the Bench Book for United States
District Court Judges "as a guide."59 After a long series of ques-
tions directed at the defendant's background, federal trial judges
are encouraged to say "something to this effect" to a defendant
who is attempting to waive the right to counsel: "I must advise
you that in my opinion you would be far better defended by a
trained lawyer than you can be by yourself. I think it is unwise of
you to try to represent yourself.... I would strongly urge you not
to try to represent yourself."60
Several recent decisions issued by the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island suggest that, at least in theory, the court has
adopted this same constitutional jurisprudence. In State v.
Chabot,61 the court reviewed a situation in which a defendant who
suggested that he had been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons
was permitted by the trial judge to waive his right to counsel at a
probation violation hearing. The court noted the trial judge's obli-
gation to determine whether the defendant's purported waiver
was knowing and intelligent, finding that the following factors
must be part of the court's determination:
(1) the background, the experience, and the conduct of the
defendant at the hearing, including his age, his educa-
tion, and his physical and mental health; (2) the extent to
which the defendant has had prior contact with lawyers
before the hearing; (3) the defendant's knowledge of the
nature of the proceeding and the sentence that may po-
tentially be reimposed; (4) the question of whether
standby counsel has been appointed and the extent to
which he or she has aided the defendant before or at the
hearing; (5) the question of whether the waiver of counsel
was the result of mistreatment or coercion; and (6) the
question of whether the defendant is trying to manipulate
the events of the hearing.62
The trial judge in that case apparently engaged in a limited
colloquy with the defendant, but failed to explore in any depth his
59. Id. at 187 n.12 (quoting 1 BENCH BOOK FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT JUDGES §§ 1.02-2 to -5 (3d ed. 1986)).
60. Id.
61. 682 A.2d 1377 (R.I. 1996).
62. Id. at 1380.
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"mental competency" to knowingly and intelligently waive his
right to counsel.63 "Because a defendant's knowledge and under-
standing of what he or she is doing is essential to effectuate a vol-
untary waiver of the right to counsel," the court held, "an inquiry
into the matter must sufficiently establish that knowledge and
understanding on the record."6 4 In reversing the trial court's find-
ing of a valid waiver, the court admonished trial judges in Rhode
Island to "'take the time to inquire into the voluntariness and in-
telligence of the waiver."' 65
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
has held that a "detailed colloquy between the trial court and the
defendant," while clearly preferable, is not constitutionally re-
quired. 66 In State v. Spencer,67 the court held that "the factors set
forth in Chabot, while mandatory in cases in which the mental
competency of the defendant is questioned, remain relevant con-
siderations" in the determination of whether a waiver is knowing
and intelligent.68 In State v. Thornton,69 the court thoroughly and
systematically reviewed each of the Chabot factors as part of its de
novo review of the trial court's ruling that a defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived the right to counsel.70 The court held in
Thornton that it could find a knowing and intelligent waiver even
in the absence of "an explicit colloquy" between the trial justice
and the defendant, but only "when other evidence in the record
clearly supports that conclusion."71 The court noted that the de-
fendant in that case made "repeated references to the dangers of
self-representation" during the course of the proceedings, thereby
establishing that he was fully cognizant of those dangers, 72 and
that "the trial justice repeatedly implored" the defendant to "ac-
cept the assistance" of an attorney.7 3 In that context, and in corn-
63. Id. at 1380-81.
64. Id. at 1381.
65. Id. (quoting Strozier v. Newsome, 871 F.2d 995, 997 n.4 (11th Cir.
1989)).
66. See, e.g., State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016, 1026-27 (R.I. 2002); State
v. Spencer, 783 A.2d 413, 416 (R.I. 2001).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 417.
69. 800 A.2d 1016 (R.I. 2002).
70. Id. at 1027-31.
71. Id. at 1027.
72. Id. at 1028.
73. Id. at 1028 n.13.
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bination with a host of other facts on the record, the court upheld
the trial justice's finding of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the
right to counsel.74
IV. DAILY PRACTICE IN RHODE ISLAND DISTRICT COURT
On a daily basis in the arraignment courtrooms of the Rhode
Island District Court, significant numbers of misdemeanor cases
are resolved when a defendant, without counsel, enters a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere to a criminal charge. In the majority of
these cases, there is no individual colloquy with the defendant
concerning the waiver of the right to counsel and no finding of
facts on the record to adequately support a finding that the defen-
dant has knowingly and intelligently waived that most sacred
constitutional right. The absence of counsel for the defendant
takes on added significance when one recognizes that the State is
generally represented at arraignment by a police officer, not a li-
censed attorney, and that no licensed attorney has ever reviewed
the charges or facts of the case at any time prior to the resolution
of the case.
Any given day in the primary arraignment courtroom in
Providence begins with the playing of a videotape to those then
assembled in the audience.75 It is important to note, however, that
even if a defendant is present in the courtroom at that moment,
his ability to hear or see the contents of the videotape may well be
limited by the bluster of activity in the well of the courtroom.
Those in custody are rarely, if ever, present in the courtroom when
the videotape is played.7 6
The advisement in the videotape concerning the right to coun-
sel provides in its entirety as follows: "[Y]ou have the right to be
represented by an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, you
may be referred to the public defender's office." 77 The advisement
74. Id. at 1031.
75. No such videotape is played in the secondary arraignment courtroom
in Providence or in any of the other district court courtrooms.
76. The videotape is also apparently played at some point in the holding
cells in the basement of the courthouse for those in custody. What percentage
of those in custody actually have the opportunity to view the videotape is dif-
ficult to ascertain.
77. Transcript of Videotape (on file with author). The reference to a "pub-
lic defender" may actually serve to confuse the average pro se defendant, who
may not understand that a public defender is actually a licensed attorney.
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does not explain that a defendant must plead not guilty in order to
obtain that referral to a public defender. The significance of this
lack of explanation is exaggerated by the "explanation" of the not
guilty plea contained in the videotape: "You can plead 'not guilty.'
You know what that means."7 8 Because it does not explain that a
not guilty plea at the arraignment is simply a means of exercising
rights and can be changed after consultation with an attorney, the
videotape almost certainly leaves most pro se defendants with the
mistaken impression that a not guilty plea is actually an assertion
of innocence. 79
Once the videotape has been played and those defendants
with retained counsel have been arraigned, the parade of pro se
misdemeanor arraignments begins. Generally, a pro se arraign-
ment begins with the judge informing the defendant of the charges
on the complaint. In addition, if the defendant is being presented
as a potential violator of bail on a pending case, or of a filing or
term of probation that has been imposed in a prior case, the de-
fendant will be informed of that fact. Next, the defendant is asked
what plea he or she would like to enter. As suggested above, most
pro se defendants undoubtedly believe that they are being asked
whether or not they think they are guilty of the crime or crimes
charged, and most probably believe that a not guilty plea is an as-
sertion of actual innocence that will subject them to harsher pen-
alties further on if determined to be untrue. What is particularly
noteworthy about this critical juncture of the arraignment is that
there has been absolutely no inquiry whatsoever about whether
the defendant would like to assert or waive his or her constitu-
tional right to be represented by counsel.80 Frequently, there is
Any lawyer who has ever practiced in a criminal court has heard a defendant,
when asked whether he or she has an attorney, respond, "No, I have a public
defender." See JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE
DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE 101 (1972).
78. Transcript of Videotape, supra note 77.
79. This popular misconception about the meaning of the not guilty plea
is shared even by some of the most well informed and well educated members
of the media, who insist on reporting that a criminal defendant has "pleaded
innocent" to a pending charge. No such plea exists in American jurispru-
dence.
80. Some courts have explicitly held that conducting an arraignment in
this sequence is a violation of the right to counsel. For example, in State v.
Howard the Supreme Court of Montana found that the practice of securing a
waiver and a guilty plea simultaneously "does not offer the defendant the op-
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also no advisement from the judge about what the sentence might
be upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
Only if the defendant has the wherewithal to enter a plea of
not guilty will the judge ask the defendant whether he or she can
afford to retain private counsel and, if the defendant says that he
or she cannot, refer the defendant to the Department of the Public
Defender. If the defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo conten-
dere, the judge will then most often ask the prosecuting police offi-
cer for a brief recitation of the factual allegations and for a
sentencing recommendation. A pre-printed written form entitled
"Request to Enter Plea of Nolo Contendere or Guilty," which is
available in English and Spanish, is then handed to the defen-
dant, who is asked to read it and sign it.
The form, much like the videotape, contains only the broadest
possible language about the right to counsel. The form begins with
a recitation of constitutional rights, including the right to remain
silent and the right to a jury trial81 By signing the form, the de-
fendant purportedly agrees that "the judge of the District Court
has advised me... that I have reasonable time to consult with an
attorney." 2 That advice appears nowhere on the videotape and is
not, as suggested above, a part of the normal discourse with a de-
fendant entering a plea.8 3 The defendant further agrees, by sign-
ing the form, that the judge has advised him or her "that I have a
right to be represented by an attorney of my own choice at my own
expense and if I cannot afford to have an attorney the court will
refer me to a public defender or other assigned attorney at no cost
to me."84 The defendant, through the pre-printed form, then pur-
portedly asserts: "I wish to proceed without a lawyer representing
portunity to expressly, affirmatively waive her right to counsel and conse-
quently violates that right." 59 P.3d 1075, 1079 (Mont. 2002). The court held
that the waiver of the right to counsel "must be express and must be secured
before the entering of a guilty plea." Id. (emphasis added).
81. Request to Enter Plea of Nolo Contendere or Guilty (on file with au-
thor).
82. Id.
83. In fact, a defendant who is presented at an arraignment as a violator
of bail in a pending case or as a violator of a previously imposed filing or pe-
riod of probation will often be permitted to consult with counsel only if he or
she is willing to spend the "reasonable time" described in the waiver form as
an inmate at the Adult Correctional Institution. See supra note 24.
84. Request to Enter Plea of Nolo Contendere or Guilty, supra note 81.
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me knowing the above rights." 5 Next comes the defendant's ac-
knowledgment that, by pleading guilty or nolo contendere, he
knows that he is giving up a variety of trial rights, including the
right to trial by jury, the right to put the State to its burden of
proof, the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against
self-incrimination, the right to confront and cross-examine wit-
nesses, and the right to testify and present evidence.8 6 At the end
of the two page form, the defendant, by signing his or her name,
purportedly attests to the following language: "I have read and re-
viewed the entire contents of this paper and I have no questions as
to what it states and means and I understand it completely. I wish
to proceed without a lawyer representing me knowing the above
rights."8 7
In some cases, the defendant signs the form the moment it is
placed in front of him or her, visibly attesting to the falsity of the
representation that the defendant has "read and reviewed the en-
tire contents" of the document. In others, the defendant is asked to
sit down and read the document, at which point the case is re-
called. After the form is signed, the judge will generally ask the
defendant in yes-or-no format whether he or she has read and un-
derstood the form and whether he or she has any questions about
its contents. The judge will generally make no inquiry whatsoever
into the defendant's background, the defendant's educational his-
tory, the defendant's mental or physical condition, or the defen-
dant's prior dealings with attorneys.8 8 It would be the rare
defendant indeed who would be willing to risk the public humilia-
tion or the perceived dangers involved in disrupting the proceed-
ings by acknowledging that he or she is illiterate or that he or she
did not understand the waiver form. After the formalities of secur-
ing pro forma answers to the judge's questions are dispensed with,
the defendant is sentenced and the case is over.
As should be obvious from the preceding description, the daily
practice in the Rhode Island District Court is a far cry from what
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. There will often be a discussion of the defendant's prior criminal his-
tory for the purposes of determining the appropriate disposition of the case,
but that discussion never reveals whether the defendant had been repre-
sented by counsel in any of his or her prior cases.
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Gideon and its progeny require. Neither the contents of the video-
tape, even if one were to assume that the defendant heard and
understood it, nor the contents of the pre-printed waiver form,
even if one were to assume that the defendant read and under-
stood it, are sufficient to make a defendant aware of 'the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation"'8 9 in any meaningful
way. While there is some information on the waiver form about
the rights that attach at the trial stage, none of the information
provided would meet the requirement set out by the United States
Supreme Court in Patterson v. Illinois9° that the defendant must
be made aware of the usefulness of counsel "at the particular pro-
ceeding."91 The defendant is not told that an attorney might be
aware of a legal defense to the charges that a layperson would be
unlikely to recognize. 92 The defendant is not told that an attorney
might find constitutional issues lurking in the case that might
lead to the suppression of vital evidence or other advantageous le-
gal rulings. The defendant is not told that an attorney might find
that the factual allegations are legally insufficient to make out the
charges in the complaint, or that the evidence might be so weak or
the sentence so severe as to make a plea of guilty or nolo conten-
dere unadvisable. The defendant is not told that an attorney can
offer advice about the great many collateral consequences that can
accompany a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, including loss of
public housing, loss of public benefits and, for the non-citizen, re-
moval from the United States. Perhaps most importantly, as it
summarizes the situation most fairly, the defendant is not advised
by the court that the waiver of the right to counsel is almost never
advisable. 93
89. State v. Spencer, 783 A.2d 413, 416 (R.I. 2001) (quoting Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975)).
90. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
91. Id. at 298.
92. In Iowa v. Tovar the United States Supreme Court held that the
Sixth Amendment did not compel this particular warning to be given in each
and every case involving the waiver of the right to counsel; rather, the Court
adhered to its previously espoused position that "the information a defendant
must have to waive counsel intelligently will 'depend, in each case, upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case.'" 124 S. Ct. 1379,
1383 (2004) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
93. The rare situation in which the waiver of the right to counsel might
be advisable is also the situation in which a purported waiver is most likely
to be involuntary: when the defendant will be incarcerated if he or she elects
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Even if one were to assume that the information and warn-
ings given to each defendant in the form of the videotape and the
pre-printed waiver form were constitutionally adequate, it is read-
ily apparent that the record in these cases is not constitutionally
adequate to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of the
right to counsel.94 Indeed, the district court seems to be acting in
defiance of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island's clearly estab-
lished preference for an individual colloquy with the defendant
about the waiver 95 and its admonition that trial judges must "'take
the time to inquire into the voluntariness and intelligence of the
waiver."' 96 The trial court's determination that a defendant has
made a knowing and intelligent waiver must be based on the indi-
vidual circumstances of the case before it, and the supreme court
has set out certain factors that it deems relevant to that determi-
nation; these factors include the defendant's background, the de-
fendant's experience with attorneys and with the criminal justice
system, the defendant's age, the defendant's education, and the
defendant's mental and physical health.97 On a daily basis, in a
significant number of cases, the district court finds a waiver of the
right to counsel without even the most minimal inquiry into these
factors. More importantly, there is no dialogue with the defendant
in any of these cases to assure that he or she appreciates in any
meaningful way the "'dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation.' 98
As the United States Supreme Court noted in Johnson v.
Zerbst,99 the "purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a right to
counsel is to protect an accused from conviction resulting from his
to be represented by counsel. See note 24 for a description of these circum-
stances.
94. In the secondary arraignment courtroom in district court in Provi-
dence, the proceedings are not recorded in any fashion. The absence of re-
cording equipment would seem to be a clear violation of Rhode Island
General Laws § 8-8-12(d), which requires the court to "appoint sufficient
court recorders to enable all proceedings to be recorded by electronic means."
R.I. GEN. LAws § 8-8-12(d) (1999) (emphasis added).
95. State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016, 1026 (R.I. 2002).
96. State v. Chabot, 682 A.2d 1377, 1381 (R.I. 1996) (quoting Strozier v.
Newsome, 871 F.2d 995, 997 n.4 (11th Cir. 1989)).
97. See State v. Spencer, 783 A.2d 413, 417 (R.I. 2001).
98. Id. at 416 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).
99. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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own ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights."100 But it is
just that ignorance that is preyed upon each and every day in the
arraignment courtrooms. The "assembly-line justice" and the "ob-
session for speedy dispositions" that the Court decried in
Argersinger v. Hamlin back in 1972 persist today in Rhode Is-
land.101 As Chief Justice Burger aptly noted some years later, the
goal of achieving justice is "ill-served, and the integrity of and
public confidence in the system are undermined, when an easy
conviction is obtained due to the defendant's ill-advised decision to
waive counsel."10 2 Forty years after Clarence Gideon's case was
decided by the United States Supreme Court, it is time for his leg-
acy to find its way into the arraignment courtrooms of the Rhode
Island District Court.
AUTHOR'S ENDNOTE
Since I completed the initial draft of this article, the leader-
ship of the Rhode Island District Court has expressed an interest
in remedying some of the deficiencies I have noted here. In par-
ticular, and with no connection whatsoever to this article, the
court has supported an effort on the part of the Department of the
Public Defender to place two Assistant Public Defenders in an ar-
raignment courtroom in Providence. Those two attorneys endeavor
to speak with and then represent those defendants who seem to be
at greatest risk of incarceration. In addition, the court has sug-
gested that it may revisit the arraignment procedures that it em-
ploys, especially the videotape and the waiver form, with an eye
toward improving those procedures with respect to purported
waivers of the right to counsel.
100. Id. at 465.
101. 407 U.S. 25, 34-36 (1972).
102. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 839 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissent-

